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Major depression is a high-prevalence mental disease with major socio-economic
impact, for both the direct and the indirect costs. Major depression symptoms can
be faked or exaggerated in order to obtain economic compensation from insurance
companies. Critically, depression is potentially easily malingered, as the symptoms that
characterize this psychiatric disorder are not difficult to emulate. Although some tools
to assess malingering of psychiatric conditions are already available, they are principally
based on self-reporting and are thus easily faked. In this paper, we propose a newmethod
to automatically detect the simulation of depression, which is based on the analysis
of mouse movements while the patient is engaged in a double-choice computerized
task, responding to simple and complex questions about depressive symptoms. This
tool clearly has a key advantage over the other tools: the kinematic movement is not
consciously controllable by the subjects, and thus it is almost impossible to deceive. Two
groups of subjects were recruited for the study. The first one, which was used to train
different machine-learning algorithms, comprises 60 subjects (20 depressed patients and
40 healthy volunteers); the second one, which was used to test the machine-learning
models, comprises 27 subjects (9 depressed patients and 18 healthy volunteers). In
both groups, the healthy volunteers were randomly assigned to the liars and truth-tellers
group. Machine-learning models were trained on mouse dynamics features, which were
collected during the subject response, and on the number of symptoms reported by
participants. Statistical results demonstrated that individuals that malingered depression
reported a higher number of depressive and non-depressive symptoms than depressed
participants, whereas individuals suffering from depression took more time to perform the
mouse-based tasks compared to both truth-tellers and liars. Machine-learning models
reached a classification accuracy up to 96% in distinguishing liars from depressed
patients and truth-tellers. Despite this, the data are not conclusive, as the accuracy of the
algorithm has not been compared with the accuracy of the clinicians; this study presents
a possible useful method that is worth further investigation.
Keywords: depression, malingering, decetpion, machine learning, automatic
Monaro et al. How to Identify Malingered Depression
INTRODUCTION
Major depression is a high-prevalence [7%; (1)] mental
disease with major socio-economic impact for both direct
(medications and hospitalization) and indirect (mortality,
work absence and turnover, disability compensation) costs
(2). Strikingly, the length of absence from work due to
depressive disorder is significantly longer than that due
to organic serious illnesses such as heart disease, back
pain, diabetes mellitus and hypertension (3). Although
important, absenteeism is not the only cost whereby
depression burdens the public health, as a critical percentage
of the national health system income is devolved for the
provision of invalidity pensions. The Italian government, for
instance, recognizes an invalidity of up to 80% for people
suffering with endogenous depression, with the consequent
allocation of monthly disability checks amounting from
270 to 500 euro per person (4). In addition, in Italy,
insurance companies spend weighty annual sums for the
compensation of psychic damage, including depression, which
could result, for example, from road accidents, stalking and
mobbing (5).
Due to the undeniable economic advantages of being
clinically depressed, major depression symptoms can be faked
or exaggerated in order to obtain economic compensation.
The literature on this topic is still at its infancy (6). In Italy,
the problem of people feigning a wide range of symptoms to
obtain disability pensions is of critical relevance. Indeed, in some
regions of Italy, people feigned many conditions, from inability
to walk to blindness to obtain economic advantages (https://
www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2013/02/09/falsi-invalidi-meccanico-
in-svizzera-da-2500-prendeva-pensione-da-1300-in-italia/
494390/; http://www.iltempo.it/economia/2016/03/31/news/
tre-milioni-di-invalidi-100-mila-falsi-1005788/). Critically, the
malingered conditions are simple to be feigned. The same might
be true for depression; its symptoms are very intuitive for naïve
people (7), as everyone has experienced low mood during life.
Importantly, experienced clinicians are trained not to only rely
on the self-reported symptoms provided by patients. Indeed,
according with the DSM-5 guidelines, outstandingly important
pieces of information also came from direct observation of
signs of depression, observation of the non-verbal behavior of
the patients, and convergence of the information reported by
patients and relatives. However, the behavioral observations rely
heavily on information that could be consciously controlled by
the patient. This is because, as depression is a very common
disorder, individuals who want to feign a depressive disorder
do not require any particular knowledge or specific training
to produce clinically reliable depressive symptoms and signs.
Furthermore, a large majority of both symptoms and signs
easy to fake: lack of concentration, restlessness, lack of interest
for daily life activities, feelings of guilt, and so on are easy to
fake if one wanted and planned to. For this reason, depression
is one of the mental disorders that are more frequently and
easily faked to achieve financial or other advantages, and this
underlines, in the forensic setting, the necessity to couple the
psychiatric examination with a different methodology, which is
less influenced by the individuals’ overt decisions to malinger a
psychiatric disorder.
Malingering is defined as the voluntary fabrication or
exaggeration of mental or physical symptoms to gain secondary
benefits, which could include financial compensations or other
advantages, such as leniency, drugs, avoiding obligations (school,
work, army), or just getting the attention of other people (8).
Although malingering is not considered to be a mental
disorder, recent scientific knowledge suggest that it should be
the focus of clinical attention, so much so that it has been
introduced in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders [DSM-5; (1)]. This has been an important step forward
in the scientific community, as the fabrication/accentuation of
symptoms or the concealment of a disorder are very frequent,
especially when the evaluation takes place in forensic contexts
(9). Although it is hard to define it reliably, literature reports an
estimate of the prevalence of malingering in a forensic setting
as ranging from 20 to 40%. (9–11). In regards to depression,
Mittenberg et al. reported that 16.08% of depressive syndromes
which are diagnosed in litigation or compensation cases are
feigned (10).
Currently, a diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder, including
depression, is formulated according to the subjective experience
that is reported by the patient and to the observation of
signs and non-verbal behavior that are easily manipulated
by the individual will to deceive (12). In other words, the
psychic symptom exists because the patient refers to it, and the
assessment of malingering is mostly based on clinical judgment
(13). While this aspect is less (or none) than a problem in
the clinical setting, in which patients are seeking help for their
sufferance and in which malingering itself become a symptom
(as in the case of factious disorder or Munchausen syndrome),
the forensic context is a quite different situation. Indeed, as
already introduced, in the psychiatric setting, symptoms can be
exaggerated or faked to obtain a secondary advantage. Thus,
classical psychiatric or clinical evaluation itself is not reliable
when dealing with forensic-relevant topic. The limitations of
classic psychiatric evaluation alone have been provocatively
investigated in a well-known experiment conducted by Rosenhan
(14), in which “pseudo-patients” feigning hallucinations were
all admitted to the psychiatric department of 12 different
highly specialized hospitals: all but one (who was diagnosed
as having a bipolar disorder) received a clinical diagnosis of
full-blown schizophrenia. In another study (15), the authors
reported that experienced psychiatrists distinguished actors and
depressed patients during a clinical interview with an accuracy
close to the chance level. Furthermore, the clinicians rated
their confidence in their diagnoses as 6.5 out of 10 in the
case of patients and 7.1 in the case of actors, denoting that
they were equally certain of their right and wrong diagnoses.
Considered together, the results of these studies highlighted the
urgent need to have complementary and integrative tools that
may strengthen the process of achieving a correct psychiatric
diagnosis.
This low reliability of the classical clinical evaluation used
alone in detecting malingering in forensic setting led to an
exponential growth of the research in this topic over the last 15
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 2 June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 249
Monaro et al. How to Identify Malingered Depression
years (16). Different strategies to detect malingering in clinical
and forensic setting have been proposed, and ad hoc tests have
been developed. Strategies are varied, but until recently, they were
mainly based on self-report questionnaires such as the M-Test
and the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology
(SIMS). The former was conceived to be specifically applied
to the feigning of schizophrenic symptoms (17), while the
latter was conceived to detect malingering of both psychiatric
syndromes, including depression, and cognitive deficits (18).
Although these instruments have been undoubtedly useful, they
share the important limitation of the psychiatric assessment as
described above: they are based on the “patients”’ report of
symptoms, and they can be easily deceived by coaching (19).
As psychiatric symptoms are easy to be feigned, unmasking the
simulation of psychiatric syndromes is much more challenging
than unmasking other pathologies (e.g., cognitive disorders),
and thus the instrument to detect them should be more
sophisticated.
An important advance over the self-report questionnaires
has been achieved in the last few years, as behavioral-based
lie detection techniques to spot the simulation of psychiatric
symptoms have been introduced. Contrary to the self-report
questionnaire, which took into consideration the explicit answers
of subjects, the behavioral methods mainly rely on implicit
measures not fully under the explicit and conscious control of
the evaluated subject. For example, the autobiographical Implicit
Association Test [aIAT; (20)] and the Concealed Information
Test [CIT; (21)] are able to identify liars based on their response
time (TR). Concerning malingering detection, the aIAT has been
successfully applied to detect whiplash malingering, confirming
an accuracy of around 90% (22), as well as to unveil phantom-
limb pain (13) and psychogenic amnesia (16). The CIT has been
principally used to assess the simulation of amnesia (21). The
main limitation of these implicit tools is that they can only
investigate one symptom at a time. In other words, more than
one aIAT or CIT would be necessary to establish whether the
subject is feigning a psychiatric syndrome or not, checking all of
the symptoms, one by one, with a specific test.
Interestingly, different studies in literature have shown that
deception can be captured through analysis of hand-motor
responses while the subject is engaged in a double-choice task
(23–26). More in general, the kinematic analysis can be used as an
implicit online measure of the mental operations that are put in
place by the subject during a task (27). A simple hand movement,
such as the movement of the mouse on the computer screen,
reflects, in real time, the evolution of the cognitive processes
underlying the action. Because lying requires great cognitive
resources (28), the motor response to a stimulus is altered in
terms of spatial and temporal features compared to the truth
telling (23, 26).
The aim of the present study is to present a new tool
specifically developed to detect malingering, which has the
important advantages of: (i) being conceived specifically to
evaluate the truthfulness of depressive syndrome (but that
might also be adapted to other psychopathologies); (ii) relying
on an implicit measure, i.e. the kinematic of movement,
which is not consciously controllable; (iii) being not easy
to cheat by knowing the symptomatology or by coaching;
(iv) being based on machine learning algorithm that will
allow the identification of liars at individual level; and (v)
considering at the same time both implicit variables and clinical
symptoms.
METHODS
Participants
As machine-learning algorithms require to be built and tested
using two independent samples, two independent groups of
participants have been selected for this research.
Group 1
Seventy-two Italian-speaking participants were recruited, with
the aim to buildmachine-learning classificationmodels. In detail,
26 patients suffering from depression were recruited (see below
for details), as well as 46 age- and gender-matched healthy
volunteers.
Before the experiment, the Beck Depression Inventory
[BDI, (29)] was administered to all participants with the
aim to exclude possible sub-clinical participants (undiagnosed
depressed participants) within the healthy controls and to
exclude responder participants (defined as clinically diagnosed
participants under medications who did not manifest depressive
symptoms) from the clinical group. Six sub-clinical participants
and six responders were identified and excluded from the
experiment. The final sample consisted of 60 participants (39
females, 21 males). The average age was 38.60 years (SD= 14.74),
and the average education level was 15.15 years (SD= 2.98).
Twenty participants were depressed patients, and the
remaining 40 individuals were healthy subjects randomly
assigned to the truth-teller (e.g., non-depressed participants who
were instructed to respond truthfully to the test; n = 20) or
liar (e.g., non-depressed participants who were instructed to
respond deceitfully to the test; n = 20) condition. An ANOVA
confirmed that the three groups were similar in terms of age
and schooling (p > 0.01 for both age and schooling), whereas
a Chi-squared test (χ2) confirms that they were similar also for
gender (all ps > 0.01). On the contrary, the groups differed in
the BDI score [F(2, 57) = 83.41, p < 0.01]: the post hoc test
highlighted that, tautologically, the truth-tellers’ BDI average
score of 6.1 (SD = 3.97) was similar to the average liars’ score
of 6.2 (SD = 3.62), while the BDI score of the depressed patients
clearly differed from the one of the healthy volunteers score of
29.5 (SD= 10.09).
The patients suffering from depression were recruited from
Azienda Ospedaliera Sant’Andrea di Roma (n = 4), Ospedale
Ca’ Foncello di Treviso (n = 10), Unità Operativa di Psichiatria,
Dipartimento di Scienze della Salute dell’Università Magna
Grecia (Catanzaro; n = 5), and Azienda Ospedaliera di Padova
(n = 1). These patients were diagnosed according to the DSM-
IV criteria by an expert psychiatrist at each site. At the time
of the study, all of the depressed participants were under
pharmacological medications, and seven of them were attending
psychotherapy.
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Group 2
A second group comprising 27 Italian-speaking participants was
also enrolled with the aim to test the model and its generalization
(30). This second group consisted of 8 males and 19 females
with an average age of 35.37 years (SD = 21.42) and an average
education level of 13.15 years (SD= 3.59) and did not statistically
differ from Group 1 in any demographic data (age: p > 0.01,
education: p > 0.01). No sub-clinical or responder participants
have been identified in this second group. As for Group 1, the
participants enrolled in group 2 comprised 9 depressed patients
(which were recruited from the same Institutions and with the
same modalities of Group 1) and 18 healthy participants. Again,
the healthy participants were randomly assigned to the truth-
teller (n = 9) or liar (n = 9) condition. The three groups did
not differ in age (p > 0.01), schooling (p > 0.01), or gender
(all ps > 0.01), while they differ in BDI score [F(2, 24) = 34.65,
p < 0.01], with the depressed patients scoring higher than the
healthy participants (truth-tellers: M = 5.8, SD = 4.02; liars:
M = 5.8, SD = 3.67; depressed:M = 27.9, SD = 9.87). All of the
depressed participants were under pharmacological medications,
and two were in psychotherapy treatment.
All of the participants provided informed consent before the
experiment. The experimental procedures were approved by the
ethics committee for psychological research of the University of
Padova and were in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki
and its later amendments.
Stimuli
The stimuli adopted in the current study consisted of simple
and complex questions about symptoms of depression and
concerning the experimental condition. Please see Monaro et al.
(31) for a description. The typical symptoms of depression
were extracted from the Depression Questionnaire (QD) of
the Cognitive Behavioural Assessment 2.0 [CBA 2.0; (32)] and
from the Structured Clinical Interview for Mood Spectrum [SCI
MOODS; (33)].
Simple questions referred to only one piece of information
related to the experimental condition (e.g., “Are you carrying
out a questionnaire?”) or one piece of information related to
a single symptom of depression (e.g., “Do you feel tired very
easily?”). Each simple question required a “yes” or “no” response.
Contrarily, complex questions are questions which comprised
two (or more) pieces of information. A complex question
required a “yes” response when both pieces of information were
true, whereas it requires a “no” response when at least one
of the two pieces of information was false. Asking complex
questions is a method used to overcharge the cognitive load
of liars (34). In fact, literature showed that the increment of
the liar’s cognitive load is an effective strategy to spot deceptive
responses (35). While a truth-teller can easily decide whether
each information is true or false, the liar has firstly to match each
piece of information with his lie and then decide about it. In
other words, the greater the number of pieces of information, the
greater the liar’s cognitive effort to monitor its plausibility (36).
More in depth, the experimental task included nine different
types of questions that could be categorized as follows:
Simple Questions (n= 30):
- 5 items referred to the experimental condition (EX; e.g., “Are
you wearing shoes?”). These are control questions to which all
participants are required to respond truthfully.
- 10 items referred to depressive symptoms (DS; e.g., “Do you
think more slowly than usual?”).
- 15 items referred to very atypical symptoms (VAS). These
questions were taken from the Affective Disorders (AF) scale
of the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology
[SIMS; (18); e.g., “Do you rarely laugh?”]. The SIMS is
a questionnaire designed to detect malingering through a
number of bizarre experiences and highly atypical psychiatric
symptoms reported by each participant. The AF scale consists
of 15 items about very atypical symptoms of anxiety and
depression. An individual is classified as malingering if he/she
reports more than five atypical symptoms.
- Complex Questions (n= 46):
- 15 items consisted of two discordant symptoms (2DS-d): a
typical symptom of depression and an atypical symptom of
depression (e.g., “Do you face difficulties to concentrate at
work, and are you full of energy?”).
- 15 items consisted of two concordant symptoms (2DS-c); both
of them were typical symptoms of depression (e.g., “Do you
feel abandoned from the others, and is your mood sad all
day?”).
- 5 items consisted of two discordant pieces of information: a
typical depression symptom and an information about the
experimental condition (DS&EX-d). One piece of information
was correct (in other words, it required a “yes” response),
while the other one was not correct (it required a “no”
response; e.g., “Do you have difficulties in concentrating, and
are you in Paris?”).
- 5 items consisted of two concordant pieces of information: a
typical depression symptom and a piece of information about
the experimental condition (DS&EX-c). Both of them are
correct (both of them required a “yes” response; e.g., “Are you
often sad, and are you sitting on a chair?”).
- 3 items consisted of two discordant pieces of information,
both of them concerning the experimental condition (2EX-
d). One information was correct (in other words, it required
a “yes” response), while the other one was not correct (it
required a “no” response; e.g., “Are the questions written in
red, and are you wearing shoes?”).
- 3 items consisted of two concordant pieces of information,
both of them concerning the experimental condition (2EX-c).
Both of them are correct (both of them required a “yes”
response; e.g., “Are you responding with the mouse, and are
you in a room?”).
The complete list of questions are reported in the Online
Supplementary Information. Questions required responding
“yes” or “no.” All participants were expected to respond in
the same way to the questions concerning the experimental
condition (EX) and the very atypical depressive symptoms (VAS).
On the contrary, truth-tellers, liars and depressed participants
were expected to respond in different ways to the questions,
including the depressive symptoms (DS). Indeed, truth-tellers
were expected to give 19 “yes” responses and 76 “no” responses
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 4 June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 249
Monaro et al. How to Identify Malingered Depression
in cases in which they denied all depressive symptoms. Depressed
participants were expected to give 44 “yes” responses and 57 “no”
responses in cases in which they manifested all of the typical
depressive symptoms. However, we contemplated that some
healthy participants could express few depressive symptoms and,
conversely, some depressed patients could deny any of the typical
symptoms. For this reason, no feedback was presented in the
case of participants who gave an unexpected response (e.g., a
healthy participant who responded “yes” to the question “Are
you in trouble falling asleep without drugs?”). Finally, liars were
expected to give some “yes” responses to depressive symptoms
similar to the ones provided by depressed participants. In other
words, liars and depressed subjects were expected to declare an
equal number of depressive symptoms.
Experimental Procedure
Just before the experimental task, participants assigned to the
liar group were instructed to lie about their mood. In particular,
they were asked to simulate a depressive status. To increase
the compliance, participants were given a little scenario: “Now,
imagine being examined by an insurance policy commission to
receive compensation for psychological damage. You have to make
them believe that the damage has caused severe depression. So,
you have to respond questions simulating a depression, trying to be
credible and avoiding being unmasked.” Conversely, truth-tellers
and depressed subjects were asked to answer all the questions
truthfully.
The task was programmed and run using MouseTracker
software (37). Each participant was presented with 76
randomized questions displayed in the upper part of the
computer screen. The squares containing YES and NO response
labels were located in the upper left and upper right parts of the
screen. Participants were instructed to press the START button
(located in the lower part of the screen) to let the questions
appear and to then respond to questions by clicking with the
mouse on the correct label (YES or NO). Figure 1 shows an
example of the computer screen as it appeared to the subjects
during the task. The experimental procedure was preceded by 10
training questions, to allow participants to familiarize themselves
with the task.
Data Collection
For each answer, motor response was tracked using
MouseTracker software (37). To permit averaging and
comparison across multiple trials, the software performs a
time normalization. Specifically, each trajectory is normalized
in 101 time frames through linear interpolation. This resulted in
each time frame corresponding to specific x and y coordinates in
a binary space. In other words, the software derived the position
of themouse along the axis over the 101 time frames (Xn,Yn). The
software also describes the motor response in terms of spatial and
temporal features, such as onset, duration, shape, stability and
direction of the trajectory. The space–time features recorded by
MouseTracker are described in detail in Table 1. For each of these
features, the average value of the responses in the different types
of questions (EX, DS, VAS, 2DS-d, 2DS-c, DS&EX-d, DS&EX-c,
2EX-d, 2EX-c) were computed. In addition, the average velocity
FIGURE 1 | The figure reports an example of the computer screen as
appeared to the subjects during the task.
TABLE 1 | The table reports the description of the space-time features recorded
by MouseTracker software.
Feature Description
Temporal features Initiation time (IT) Time between the appearance of
the question and the beginning
of the mouse movement
Reaction time (RT) Time from the appearance of the
question to the click on the
response box
Maximum deviation
time (MD-time)
Time to reach the point of
maximum deviation
Spatial features Maximum deviation
(MD)
The largest perpendicular
distance between the actual
trajectory and the ideal trajectory
Area under the curve
(AUC)
The geometric area between the
actual trajectory and the ideal
trajectory
x-flip Number changes in direction
along the x-axis
y-flip Number changes in of direction
along the y-axis
(v) and acceleration (a) of the mouse movement between two
time frames, respectively, on the x-axis (vx = Xn –Xn−1 and
ax = vxn – vxn−1) and y-axis (vy = Yn – Yn−1 and ay = vyn –
vyn−1) were calculated. The number of symptoms reported by
the participants (DS, 2DS-d, 2DS-c, DS&EX-d, DS&EX-c, and
VAS) and the number of errors in the control questions related
to the experimental condition (EX, 2EX-d, 2EX-c) were also
computed. This procedure led to a total of 83 variables that
were entered as predictors in machine-learning models (please
see the online supplements for a detailed description of the 83
features).
RESULTS
Visual Analysis of Mouse Trajectories
A preliminary visual analysis was carried out comparing the
trajectories of the three experimental groups. Figure 2 compares
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FIGURE 2 | The figure represents the average trajectories between the participants, respectively for liars (in red), truth-tellers (in green) and depressed subjects (in
blue), to all questions (EX, DS, VAS, 2DS-d, 2DS-c, DS&EX -d, DS&EX-c, 2 EX-d, 2EX-c).
the average trajectories of liars, truth-tellers and depressed
subjects, considering their responses to all the 76 questions. The
visual pattern is similar to the one observed in other studies
that spot liars through mouse dynamics (26). The trajectories
of liars and truth-tellers seem to differ in both AUC and MD
parameters. Indeed, both healthy and depressed truth-tellers
outlined a more direct trajectory connecting the starting point
with the correct response. By contrast, in the initial phase of the
response, the liars spent more time moving on the y-axis, and
they then deviated toward the response with a delay compared to
truth-tellers.
Univariate Statistical Analysis
In Table 2, the descriptive statistics of the three experimental
groups were reported for the space–time features
collected by the software considering all the 76 items of
the task.
A univariate one-way ANOVA was performed on each of the
83 collected features with the aim of identifying the variables that
TABLE 2 | The table reports means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for each
feature collected by the software.
Feature Truth-tellers Depressed Liars
M SD M SD M SD
IT 620.35 491.94 408.67 332.99 559.57 399.84
RT 4018.79 1466.98 6641.81 3204.22 4030.60 1203.67
MD-time 2392.37 1001.23 4199.85 1818.62 2297.64 620.98
MD 0.44 0.31 0.51 0.30 0.57 0.24
AUC 1.01 0.90 1.09 0.76 1.25 0.67
x-flip 7.64 2.24 8.75 2.94 9.23 2.72
y-flip 7.74 2.63 8.05 2.88 9.20 2.67
vx 0.00627 0.00060 0.00582 0.00076 0.00573 0.00059
vy 0.01326 0.00014 0.01315 0.00010 0.01326 0.00017
ax −0.00001 0.00004 0.00001 0.00002 0.00000 0.00002
ay −0.00004 0.00008 −0.00006 0.00004 −0.00001 0.00009
IT, initiation time; RT, reaction time; MD-time, maximum deviation time; MD, maximum
deviation; AUC, area under the curve; x-flip, y-flip, average velocity and acceleration on
x and y axis = vx , vy , ax , ay , respectively for liars, truth-tellers and depressed subjects
responding to all questions.
statistically differed between groups. Table 3 reports the variables
that differed the three groups.
Finally, a Tukey test was run as a post hoc test to verify
which groups accounted for the significant differences found by
ANOVA. The results are reported in Table 4.
TABLE 3 | The table reports F-value, degrees of freedom (gdl), p-value and
effect-size (Omega-squared, ω2) resulting from the comparison of the three
experimental groups for the features that reached the statistical significance.
Feature One-way ANOVA (gdl, F-value,
p-value, effect-size)
DS F (2,57) = 93.59, p < 0.01, ω = 0.87
EX F (2,57) = 3.84, p < 0.05, ω = 0.29
2DS-d F (2,57) = 22.94, p < 0.01, ω = 0.64
2DS-c F (2,57) = 91.42, p < 0.01, ω = 0.86
DS&EX-c F (2,57) = 23.49, p < 0.01, ω = 0.65
VAS F (2,57) = 85.6, p < 0.01, ω = 0.85
RT F (2,57) = 9.87, p < 0.01, ω = 0.47
RT DS F (2,57) = 15.22, p < 0.01, ω = 0.56
RT EX F (2,57) = 4.52, p < 0.05, ω = 0.32
RT 2DS-d F (2,57) = 9.24, p < 0.01, ω = 0.46
RT 2DS-c F (2,57) = 11.3, p < 0.01, ω = 0.50
RT DS&EX-d F (2,57) = 7.06, p < 0.01, ω = 0.41
RT DS&EX-c F (2,57) = 7.50, p < 0.01, ω = 0.42
RT 2EX-d F (2,57) = 4.29, p < 0.05, ω = 0.31
RT 2EX-c F (2,57) = 6.06, p < 0.01, ω = 0.38
RT VAS F (2,57) = 7.35, p < 0.01, ω = 0.41
MD-time F (2,57) = 14.68, p < 0.01, ω = 0.55
MD-time DS F (2,57) = 18.25, p < 0.01, ω = 0.60
MD-time EX F (2,57) = 3.25, p < 0.05, ω = 0.26
MD-time 2DS-d F (2,57) = 11.68, p < 0.01, ω = 0.51
MD-time 2DS-c F (2,57) = 14.47, p < 0.01, ω = 0.55
MD-time DS&EX-d F (2,57) = 9.04, p < 0.01, ω = 0.45
MD-time DS&EX-c F (2,57) = 9.2, p < 0.01, ω = 0.46
MD-time 2EX-d F (2,57) = 4.27, p < 0.05, ω = 0.31
MD-time 2EX-c F (2,57) = 12.61, p < 0.01, ω = 0.52
MD-time VAS F (2,57) = 12.62, p < 0.01, ω = 0.52
vx F (2,57) = 3.85, p < 0.05, ω = 0.29
vy F (2,57) = 4.06, p < 0.05, ω = 0.30
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TABLE 4 | Differences between truth-tellers and liars, liars and depressed,
truth-tellers and depressed.
Feature Difference between groups Tukey test, t-value, p-value
TRUTH-TELLERS vs. LIARS
DS −7.75 t = −13.38, p <01
2DS-d 5.25 t = 6.73, p < 0.01
2DS-c −11.85 t = −13.46, p < 0.01
DS&EX-c −2.40 t = −6.17, p < 0.01
VAS −6.80 t = −13.02, p < 0.01
vx 0.00053 t = 2.59, p < 0.05
LIARS vs. DEPRESSED
DS 2.45 t = 4.23, p < 0.01
2DS-d −2.15 t = −2.75, p < 0.05
2DS-c 5.00 t = 5.68, p < 0.01
VAS 2.85 t = 5.46, p < 0.01
RT −2611.21 t = −3.84, p < 0.01
RT DS −2036.49 t = −4.79, p < 0.01
RT 2DS-d −3507.4 t = −3.89, p < 0.01
RT 2DS-c −2880.60 t = −4.14, p < 0.01
RT DS&EX-c −5171.2 t = −3.60, p < 0.01
RT 2EX-d −2708.4 t = −2.79, p < 0.05
RT 2EX-c −1403.2 t = −2.77, p < 0.05
RT VAS −2012.3 t = −3.14, p < 0.01
MD-time −1902.21 t = −4.80, p < 0.01
MD-time DS −1182.22 t = −5.40, p < 0.01
MD-time 2DS-d −2494.9 t = −4.39, p < 0.01
MD-time 2DS-c −2076.4 t = −4.81, p < 0.01
MD-time DS&EX-d −1741.8 t = −2.97, p < 0.05
MD-time DS&EX-c −4187.4 t = −3.92, p < 0.01
MD-TIME 2EX-d −1968.1 t = −2.88, p < 0.05
MD-TIME 2EX-c −13.45.5 t = −4.54, p < 0.01
MD-TIME VAS −1514.67 t = −4.35, p < 0.01
vy 0.00013 t = 2.56, p < 0.05
TRUTH-TELLERS vs. DEPRESSED
DS −5.30 t = −9.15, p < 0.01
EX 0.45 t = 2.72, p < 0.05
2DS-d 3.10 t = 3.97, p < 0.01
2DS-c −6.85 t = −7.78, p < 0.01
DS&EX-c −2.20 t = −5.66, p < 0.01
VAS −3.95 t = −7.56, p < 0.01
RT −2623.02 t = −3.85, p < 0.01
RT DS −2019.08 t = −4.75, p < 0.01
RT EX −1027.1 t = −3.01, p < 0.05
RT 2DS-d −3183.4 t = −3.53, p < 0.01
RT 2DS-c −2836.75 t = −4.08, p < 0.01
RT DS&EX-d −3480 t = −3.70, p < 0.01
RT DS&EX-c −4350.8 t = −3.30, p < 0.05
RT 2EX-c −1621.3 t = −3.20, p < 0.01
RT VAS −2225.7 t = −3.47, p < 0.01
MD-time −1807.48 t = −4.56, p < 0.01
MD-time DS −1100.85 t = −5.03, p < 0.01
MD-time EX −560 t = −2.50, p < 0.05
MD-time 2DS–d −2240.2 t = −3.94, p < 0.01
MD-time 2DS-c −1937.7 t = −4.491, p < 0.01
MD-time DS&EX-d −2407.9 t = −4.11, p < 0.01
MD-time DS&EX-c −3742.3 t = −3.50, p < 0.01
MD-time 2EX-c −1219.7 t = −4.12, p < 0.01
MD-time VAS −1510.78 t = −4.34, p < 0.01
The table reports t-value, p-value and effect-size resulting from Tukey test and the value of
the difference between the compared groups. Only the results that reached the statistical
significance are reported.
TABLE 5 | The table reports the 6 features resulted from the features selection.
Feature Ranked attributes
DS 0.55
2DS-c 0.52
2DS-d 0.41
VAS 0.52
MD-time 2DS-d 0.36
MD-time VAS 0.37
The second column reports the value of the correlation between the feature and the
dependent variable (truth-teller vs. liar vs. depressed).
Multivariate Analysis: Features Selection
In order to select the variables to be entered in machine-learning
models, a features selection was performed usingWEKA 3.9 (38).
Features selection is a widely used procedure in machine learning
that allows the removal of redundant and irrelevant features and
an increase of model generalization by reducing overfitting (39).
In the current paper, a correlation-based feature selector (CFS)
was used to reduce the number of features (40). This algorithm
selects the independent variables with the maximum correlation
with the dependent variable (truth-teller vs liar vs depressed)
and the minimum correlation across independent variables (the
83 features), using greedy stepwise as search method. The
features selected by the CFS are the following: the number of
very atypical symptoms (VAS) reported by each participant, the
number of depressive symptoms reported by each participant
in simple questions (DS), the number of symptoms reported
by the participants when they responds to 2DS-c and 2DS-d
questions (i.e., complex questions, concordant or discordant,
about depressive symptoms), the time needed to reach the point
of maximum deviation in 2DS-d questions (MD-time 2DS-d)
and the time needed to reach the point of maximum deviation
in questions about very atypical symptoms (MD-time VAS). The
selected features are reported in Table 5.
Multivariate Analysis: Machine-Learning
Models
The six features mentioned above were entered in different
machine-learning (ML) classifiers. Particularly, we selected four
different classifiers that differ for the classification strategy (41–
44): Naive Bayes, Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO),
Logistic Model Tree (LMT) and Random Forest (RF). For each
classifier, a three-class classification (as the model is required
to classify depressed patients, liars and truth-tellers) was run
using a 10-fold cross-validation procedure, as implemented
in WEKA 3.9 (38). In 10-fold cross-validation, the sample
of 60 participants is randomly partitioned into 10 equal size
subsamples (n = 6). Of the 10 subsamples, a single subsample
is retained as the validation set for testing the model, and the
remaining 9 subsamples are used as training sets. The cross-
validation process is recursively repeated 10 times, each time
with one of the 10 subsamples used as a validation set. The 10
results from the folds are finally averaged to produce a single
classification accuracy estimation. The classification accuracies
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TABLE 6 | Accuracies obtained by four different ML classifiers in 10-fold
cross-validation and in test set.
Classifier Accuracy in 10-fold-cross
validation (n = 60) (%)
Accuracy in test set
(n = 27) (%)
Naïve Bayes 90 96.3
SMO 83.3 92.6
LMT 81.6 96.3
Random Forest 80 92.6
Classifiers are Naïve Bayes, Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO), Logistic Model Tree
(LMT) and Random Forest.
TABLE 7 | Classification accuracies of liars and depressed participants by four
different ML classifiers in 10-fold cross-validation and in test set.
Classifier Accuracy in 10-fold-cross
validation (n = 60) (%)
Accuracy in test set
(n = 28) (%)
Naïve Bayes 80 94.4
SMO 82.5 88.9
LMT 80 88.9
Random Forest 87.5 94.4
Classifiers are Naïve Bayes, Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO), Logistic Model Tree
(LMT) and Random Forest.
obtained by the four classifiers in 10-fold cross-validation are
reported in Table 6. All the classifiers achieved an accuracy
ranging from 80 to 90%. In a subsequent step, the four algorithms
(ML models) were tested on the group 2 (test = 27 participants)
to verify the generalization of the results on an independent
sample of participants This allowed us to demonstrate that
all the models have a good generalization, as the classification
accuracies remain stable at over 90%. The ML results on both
the training (n = 60) and test (n = 27) sets are represented in
Table 6.
However, in real world settings, the examiner is required
to successfully distinguish malingering from real depression.
Thus, the classifications were repeated, entering only liars and
depressed participants as classes. In other words, we made
a two-class classification and ignored truth-teller participants.
The features were selected using the same method described
above and then entered in the four classifiers (ML models).
The selected features were the following: DS, 2DS-d, 2DS-
c, VAS, IT 2EX-d, IT 2EX-c, RT 2EX-c, MD-time, MD-
time DS, MD-time 2DS-d, MD-time DS&EX-c, MD-time
VAS, ay, and y-flip DS. Classification accuracies, which
were revealed to be stable around 90%, are reported in
Table 7.
As ML models are difficult to interpret; a decision tree
model has been run (45). The decision tree model gives a more
simple idea about the hypothetical decision rules, on which the
classifications results are based. This is one of the simplest— if not
the simplest—classifier in terms of transparency of the operations
computed by the algorithm, and it permits easy highlighting
of the classification logic [even if it is not the most efficient
method; (46)]. The structure of the tree is reported in Figure 3.
This model is basically built on two rules. The first rule takes
FIGURE 3 | The figure reports the structure of the decision tree model.
Participants declaring <3.5 symtomps on 2DS-c questions are classified as
truth-tellers. Participants declaring more than 3.5 symtomps on 2DS-c
questions are depressed patients if and only if they take more than 4048ms to
compute the response to the 2DS-d questions, otherwise they are classified
as liars.
into account the number of symptoms declared by the subject
in the 2DS-c questions. If the participant reports fewer than
3.5 symptoms, he/she is classified as a truth-teller; else, the
second rule is considered. According to the second rule, if the
subject takes, on average, more than 4,048ms to compute the
response to the 2DS-d questions, he/she is either a depressed
patient or a liar. This simple algorithm reaches an accuracy
of 75% in the training group (correctly identifying 51 subjects
out of 60), generalizing with an accuracy of 85.2% in the test
group.
Multivariate Analysis: Alternative Models
One of the most discussed topics in lie detection concerns the
resistance to countermeasures (47). If the participant knows
how lie detectors work, he/she may enact a series of strategies
to reduce its efficacy. For example, an alteration of RTs is
enough to beat aIAT or CIT (48, 49), as this is the only
parameter on which they are based. In order to prevent
countermeasures, the kinematic analysis of mouse movements
offers a significant advantage: it is not based simply on RTs but on
numerous and articulated parameters that, together, contribute
to determine the truthfulness of the subject’s response (26).
In other words, it would be very difficult for the participants
to alter all of the parameters at the same time and keep
them under control. Moreover, the large number of features
allows the building of alternative classification models. In this
way, the examinee cannot know in advance which features are
entered in the prediction model and, accordingly, which are
the features to keep under control during the test. To fix this
point, we developed two alternative machine-learning models,
entering in the classifiers a subsets of predictors different from
those above used. The six features selected above are the best
to optimize the classifier’s performance. However, other sub-
optimal sets of features can work well in the classification. A
first set of alternative predictors contained the five features
most correlated to the dependent variable: DS (r = 0.55), 2DS-
c (r = 0.53), VAS (r = 0.52), DS&EX-c (r = 0.45), MD-
time DS (r = 0.42). A second subset of predictors included
only features related to complex questions about depressive
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TABLE 8 | Classification of participants using two set of alternative predictors.
Classifier Accuracy in 10-fold-cross
validation (n = 60) (%)
Accuracy in test set
(n = 27) (%)
SUBSET OF PREDICTORS 1
Naïve Bayes 85 88.9
SMO 83.3 88.9
LMT 80 92.6
Random Forest 80 88.9
SUBSET OF PREDICTORS 2
Naïve Bayes 81.6 96.3
SMO 78.3 92.6
LMT 76.7 85.2
Random Forest 75 92.6
Alternative models were computed using four different ML classifiers (Naïve Bayes, SMO,
LMT, Random Forest). Accuracies in 10-fold cross-validation and in test set are reported.
symptoms (2DS-c and 2DS-d), which are the stimuli aimed to
increase liars’ cognitive load: 2DS-c, 2DS-d, IT 2DS-c, IT 2DS-
d, MD-time 2DS-c, MD-time 2DS-d, RT 2DS-c, RT 2DS-d, MD
2DS-c, MD 2DS-d, AUC 2DS-c, AUC 2DS-d, x-flip 2DS-c, x-
flip 2DS-d, y-flip 2DS-c, and y-flip 2DS-d. The results obtained
from the alternative models are reported in Table 8. It can
be noticed that the accuracies remain stable at around 90%,
supporting the reliability of this method for the identification of
liars.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The present study investigated the accuracy of a new
deception detection technique in the correct identification
of participants who malingered depressive symptoms. To
this aim, a tool based on mouse tracking was used while
participants were required to answer simple or complex
questions concerning both symptoms of depression and the
experimental situation.
The main result is striking: the individuals who malingered
depressive symptoms were correctly identified by the algorithm
with an accuracy of up to 96%. In addition, the current
study also underlined that: (i) the mouse trajectory of
the liars visually clearly differed from the ones of the
truth-tellers (regardless of whether the latter were really
depressed); (ii) the group of individuals that malingered
depression reported a higher number of depressive and non-
depressive symptoms; (iii) the ML classifiers recognized the
complex questions within the key features for a correct
classification and (iv) liars are also faster than the really
depressed subjects—but slower than the healthy truth-tellers—
to perform the mouse-based task, as the algorithm identified,
as a critical variable for the discrimination, the time to
reach the point of maximum deviation during the mouse
response.
Importantly, similar results were obtained testing four
different ML models (Naïve Bayes, SMO, LTM, Random Forest).
This denotes that the results are not highly dependent on
the selected algorithm. Furthermore, the main results are
obtained using highly selected features, raising the suspicion
that they cannot be generalized using different features. This
is of outstanding importance, as the number of depressive
symptoms (DS) and the number of very atypical symptoms
(VAS) were included in the feature selection within the main
analysis. Because both DS and VAS could be obtained using
simpler tests, as, for instance, the M-test explained in the
introduction, one may wonder about the advantage of using
the current mouse tracking techniques and whether the current
results remain stable even if DS and VAS were removed from
the features used for the classification. Critically, these concerns
were dampened by the results obtained using alternative ML
models, which includes only one (DS) or none of these features
within the features selected for the classification. In addition,
DS has not been used alone but within the complex sentences.
As these alternative models achieved very high classification
accuracies as well, this rules out the hypotheses that the
current results were driven by the selected features and also
sustains the hypothesis that the proposed tools are not easily
fooled by coaching. Indeed, the high number of parameters
that could be considered to build up the best classifiers and
the great variability in the features that could be selected by
each classifier makes the new tool ideally suited to be almost
impossible to be deceived. Thus, the results reported in the
current paper are robust to the ML method and feature selection
changes.
It is also worth noting that the tool is based on both
mouse tracking movements and the technique of unexpected
questions. Contrarily to previously used tests (for instance, the
M-test), the current algorithm is able to detect the number
of symptoms reported by each individual only relying on the
use of the complex sentences (2DS-c, 2DS-d), as revealed by
the alternative model, and thus excludes potential features
that are more easy to be faked, as, for instance, the number
of symptoms (DS) and the number of atypical symptoms
(VAS).
Concerning the number of symptoms, it should be noted
that malingering participants tend to report most of the
symptoms which are presented during the task, both typical
symptoms of depression (DS) and atypical symptoms (VAS)
characterizing other mental disorders. In other words, liars
reported being affected by a higher number of psychiatric
symptoms than those people who were genuinely depressed.
This result is line with literature reporting that the qualitative
and quantitative analysis of symptom characteristics is a
crucial method to identify simulators (16). It is well known
that malingering is often characterized by a positive response
to suggested symptoms and a tendency to endorse many
symptoms indiscriminately (50). Indeed, malingerers believe
that endorsing a symptom will increase the appearance
of psychopathology and that more symptoms will be
construed as a more severe disorder. On the other hand,
genuine patients report only the symptoms that they are
really experiencing, resulting in a lower number and more-
common symptoms. For this reason, common strategies to
detect a malingered response pattern consist in verifying
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the endorsement of rare and improbable symptoms [e.g.,
this is how the SIMS works; (18)] or the over-endorsement
of symptoms.
The second important piece of evidence concerns the mouse
dynamics features. As emerged from the univariate analyses
and the algorithm’s features selection, the most significant
differences between the three experimental groups are in the
time to compute the response (RT) and the time to reach
the point of maximum deviation (MD-time). In more detail,
depressed subjects take more time to respond than the subjects
of the other two experimental conditions (liars and truth-
tellers) for both simple and complex questions. This result
reinforces the evidence available in literature that depression
is characterized by psychomotor and ideomotor retardation
[diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness;
(1)]. In other words, depressed people are differentiated from
liars not on the basis of the cognitive load, which is higher in
liars than in depressed people (who are responding truthfully),
but on the basis of the psychomotor retardation, which is a
key feature of truly depressed individuals. On the contrary,
according to lie-detection literature, liars are slower than healthy
truth-tellers, as the greater cognitive load due to the act of
lie results in more time needed to compute the response
(51).
It is important here to underline that, despite the fact
that in literature, it is already known that individuals that
feign depression usually report a higher number of symptoms
compared to really depressed patients (50) and despite it is
already known that lying takes time (28) and thus that liars are, in
general, consistently slower than truth-tellers, this study enriches
the literature by providing an automatic algorithm that allows
combination of the two pieces of information. Critically, this
enabled the identification of three different profiles: the non-
depressed truth-tellers are characterized by a low number of
reported symptoms and by quick answers; the depressed truth-
tellers are characterized by a good number of reported symptoms
and are very slow in answering and the liars are characterized
by a very high number of reported symptoms, and their reaction
times are slower than those of the non-depressed truth-tellers but
quicker than those of depressed patients.
Finally, two drawbacks are worth highlighting. First, in
this paper, the clinician and the machine-learning algorithm
performance in detecting malingering has not been compared.
Indeed, individuals were selected if they already had a diagnosis
of depression. In addition, healthy participants assigned to
the truth-tellers or liars groups never underwent a psychiatric
examination but were screened using a self-report questionnaire.
Thus, we cannot draw definitive conclusions on the superiority
of machine learning compared to clinical assessment in
detecting the malingering of depression. To date, we can
only hypothesize the superiority of machine learning based
on previous literature (14, 15). Secondly, eventual cognitive
difficulties in patients with depression have not been taken
into account. Thus, particular attention should be given to the
application of this tool to patients with cognitive disabilities.
Those patients could show difficulties both in processing the
meaning of the complex questions and in giving the response
(they are more likely to drag the mouse while attempting
to make a decision, causing distorted trajectories and longer
reaction times), obtaining a worse performance than liars.
Therefore, the examiner should take into account that the
cognitive functioning of the examinee could influence the task
performance and thus alter the classifier result. Thus, further
studies are needed before this algorithm could be applied to a
real-world forensic setting. In particular, this study highlights
an urgent need to compare the performance of clinicians
and machine learning in detecting malingering, taking into
consideration the cognitive difficulties the real patients might be
suffering.
In conclusion, we provided evidence that the current
algorithm, through an accurate feature selection procedure, can
accurately identify up to 96% of the liars. This methodology,
compared with the ones currently available in the literature and
described in the introduction, has the following advantages:
first, this tool is not possible to be cheated on, as there
are too many parameters that are taken into consideration;
secondly, specialized clinicians are not required to administer
it and interpret the results, thus enhancing the possibility
of wide use, such as by insurers; thirdly, a single test could
be sufficient to understand whether or not an individual
is malingering a multifaceted disorder like depression. On
the contrary, previous instruments for detecting deception,
such as aIAT and CIT, allowed the investigation of a single
symptom instead of the disorder itself. Despite the fact that
this mouse tracker-based tool has been developed and tested
to identify individuals who feigned depression, the same
technique could be potentially adapted to allow a wider
use and generalization to other psychiatric disorders such
as anxiety disorders and PTSD or physical disturbances
such as whiplash. Before the translational application to
real world forensic setting, further studies are needed
to compare the performance of the machine-learning
algorithm with the performance of clinicians in detecting
malingering.
ETHICS APPROVAL AND CONSENT TO
PARTICIPATE
The ethics committee for psychological research of the
University of Padova approved the experimental procedure
(Unique Number: 276B8771D4B0F6FDC748E0ABE46D460C).
All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki.
AVAILABILITY OF DATA AND MATERIALS
The dataset used and analyzed during the current study
is available from the corresponding author upon reasonable
request.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 10 June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 249
Monaro et al. How to Identify Malingered Depression
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
MM, GS, and CS: Conceived the experiment; MM and AT:
Designed the experimental task; MM and AT: Healthy subjects
data acquisition; AT, SF, GT, MV, PD, GP, and TM: Depressed
patients data acquisition; MM and GS: Data analysis; MM,
GS, and CS: Data interpretation; MM, GS, and CS: Drafting
of the manuscript. All the authors revised the manuscript
critically and gave the final approval of the version to be
published.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyt.
2018.00249/full#supplementary-material
REFERENCES
1. American Psychiatric Association. DSM V. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders. Arlington: American Psychiatric Publishing. (2013).
2. Cuijpers P, Smit F. Subclinical depression: a clinically relevant condition?
Tijdschr Psychiatr. (2008) 50:519–528.
3. Druss BG, Rosenheck RA, Sledge WH. Health and disability costs of
depressive illness in a major U.S. corporation. Am J Psychiatry (2000)
157:1274–8. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.157.8.1274
4. Ferrari RM. Breve Manuale di Invalidità Civile. (2016). Available Online at:
http://www.raggiungere.it/attachments/article/387/Breve%20Manuale%20di
%20Invalidit%C3%A0%20Civile.pdf
5. Andreani A. Tabella danno biologico di lieve entità. (2017). Available Online
at: https://www.avvocatoandreani.it/servizi/calcolo_danno_biologico.php
6. Hayes J, Grieve R. Faked depression: comparing malingering via the internet,
pen-and-paper, and telephone administration modes. Telemed E Health
(2013) 19:714–6. doi: 10.1089/tmj.2012.0278
7. Sullivan K, King J. Detecting faked psychopathology: a comparison of
two tests to detect malingered psychopathology using a simulation
design. Psychiatry Res. (2010) 176:75–81. doi: 10.1016/j.psychres.
2008.07.013
8. Rogers R. (2008). Clinical Assessment of Malingering and Deception. ed R.
Rogers. Guilford Press.
9. Greve KW, Ord JS, Bianchini KJ, Curtis KL. Prevalence of malingering
in patients with chronic pain referred for psychologic evaluation in
a medico-legal context. Arch Phys Med Rehabil. (2009) 90:1117–26.
doi: 10.1016/j.apmr.2009.01.018
10. Mittenberg W, Patton C, Canyock EM, Condit DC. Base rates of malingering
and symptom exaggeration. J Clin Exp Neuropsychol. (2002) 24:1094–1102.
doi: 10.1076/jcen.24.8.1094.8379
11. Young G. Psychological injury and law malingering in forensic disability-
related assessments: prevalence 15 ± 15%. Psychol Inj Law (2015) 8:188–199.
doi: 10.1007/s12207-015-9232-4
12. Adetunji BA, Basil B, Mathews M, Williams A, Osinowo T, Oladinni O.
Detection and management of malingering in a clinical setting. Prim
psychiatry (2006) 13:61–69.
13. Ferrara SD, Ananian V, Baccino E, Boscolo–Berto R, Domenici R, Hernàndez-
Cueto C, et al. A novel methodology for the objective ascertainment
of psychic and existential damage. Int J Legal Med. (2016) 130:1387–99.
doi: 10.1007/s00414-016-1366-8
14. Rosenhan D. On being sane in insane places. Science (1973) 179:250–8.
doi: 10.1126/science.179.4070.250
15. Rosen J, Mulsant BH, Bruce ML, Mittal V, Fox D. Actors’ portrayals of
depression to test interrater reliability in clinical trials. Am J Psychiatry (2004)
161:1909–11. doi: 10.1176/ajp.161.10.1909
16. Sartori G, Orrù G, Zangrossi A. Detection of Malingering in personal injury
and damage ascertainment. In: Ferrara SD, Boscolo-Berto R, Viel G, editors.
Personal Injury and Damage Ascertainment under Civil Law. Springer (2016).
pp. 547–58.
17. Beaber RJ, Marston A, Michelli J, Mills MJ. A brief test for measuring
malingering in schizophrenic individuals. Am J Psychiatry (1985) 142:1478–
81. doi: 10.1176/ajp.142.12.1478
18. Smith GP, Burger GK. Detection of malingering: validation of the Structured
Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS). J Am Acad Psychiatry Law
(1997) 25:183–9.
19. Storm J, Graham JR. Detection of coached general malingering on the MMPI-
−2. Psychol. Assess. (2000) 12:158–165. doi: 10.1037/1040-3590.12.2.158
20. Agosta S, Sartori G. The autobiographical IAT: a review.
Front. Psychol. (2013) 4:519. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.
00519
21. Allen JJB. Clinical applications of the Concealed Information Test. In:
Verschuere B, Ben-Shakhar G, Meijer E. editors. Memory Detection. Theory
and Application of the Concealed Information Test. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (2011). pp. 231–252.
22. Sartori G, Agosta S, Gnoato F. High accuracy detection of malingered
whiplash syndrome. In: International Whiplash Trauma Congress. (Miami,
FL) (2007).
23. Duran ND, Dale R, McNamara DS. The action dynamics of overcoming the
truth. Psychon Bull Rev. (2010) 17:486–491. doi: 10.3758/PBR.17.4.486
24. Monaro M, Fugazza FI, Gamberini L, Sartori G. How human-mouse
interaction can accurately detect faked responses about identity. In:
Gamberini L, Spagnolli A, Jacucci G, Blankertz B, Freeman J editors. Symbiotic
Interaction. Symbiotic 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol 9961.
Cham: Springer. (2017). pp. 115–124.
25. Monaro M, Gamberini L, Sartori G. Identity verification using a kinematic
memory detection technique. In: Hale K, Stanney K editors, Advances in
Neuroergonomics and Cognitive Engineering. Advances in Intelligent Systems
and Computing, Vol. 488. Cham: Springer (2017). pp. 123–132.
26. Monaro M, Gamberini L, Sartori G. The detection of faked identity using
unexpected questions and mouse dynamics. PLoS ONE (2017) 12:e0177851.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0177851
27. Freeman JB, Dale R, Farmer TA. Hand in motion reveals mind in motion.
Front Psychol. (2011) 2:59. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00059
28. Suchotzki K, Verschuere B, Van Bockstaele B, Ben-Shakhar G, Crombez G.
Lying takes time: a meta-analysis on reaction time measures of deception.
Psychol. Bull. (2017) 143:428–453. doi: 10.1037/bul0000087
29. Beck AT, Ward CH, Mendelson M, Mock J, Erbaugh J. An inventory
for measuring depression. Arch Gen Psychiatry (1961) 4:561–571.
doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.1961.01710120031004
30. Dwork C, Feldman V, Hardt M, Pitassi T, Reingold O, Roth A. The reusable
holdout: preserving validity in adaptive data analysis. Science (2015) 349:3–6.
doi: 10.1126/science.aaa9375
31. Monaro M, Gamberini L, Zecchinato F, Sartori G. False identity
detection using complex sentences. Front Psychol. (2018) 9:283.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00283
32. Bertolotti G, Michielin P, Vidotto G, Zotti AM, Sanavio E. Depression
questionnaire (DQ). In: Nezu AM, Ronan GF, Meadows EA, McKlure KS,
editors. Practitioner’s Guide to Empirical Based Measures of Depression.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic; Plenum Publishers (2000). pp. 45–47.
33. Fagiolini A, Dell’osso L, Pini S, Armani A, Bouanani S, Rucci P, et al. Validity
and reliability of a new instrument for assessing mood symptomatology:
the Structured Clinical Interview for Mood Spectrum (SCI-MOODS). Int J
Methods Psychiatr Res. (1999) 8:71–82.
34. Walczyk JJ, Igou FP, Dixon AP, Tcholakian T. Advancing lie detection by
inducing cognitive load on liars: a review of relevant theories and techniques
guided by lessons from polygraph-Based approaches. Front. Psychol. (2013)
4:14. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00014
35. Vrij A, Leal S, Granhag PA, Mann S, Fisher RP, Hillman J, et al. Outsmarting
the liars: the benefit of asking unanticipated questions. Law Hum. Behav.
(2009) 33:159–166. doi: 10.1007/s10979-008-9143-y
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 11 June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 249
Monaro et al. How to Identify Malingered Depression
36. Williams EJ, Bott LA, Patrick J, Lewis MB. Telling lies: the irrepressible truth?
PLoS ONE (2013) 8:e60713. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0060713
37. Freeman JB, Ambady N. MouseTracker: software for studying real-
time mouse-tracking method. Behav Res Methods (2010) 42:226–241.
doi: 10.3758/BRM.42.1.226
38. Hall MA, Frank E, Holmes G, Pfahringer B, Reutemann P, Witten IH. The
WEKA data mining software: an update. ACM SIGKDD Explor. Newslett.
(2009) 11:10–18. doi: 10.1145/1656274.1656278
39. Bermingham ML, Pong-Wong R, Spiliopoulou A, Hayward C, Rudan
I, Campbell H, et al. Application of high-dimensional feature selection:
evaluation for genomic prediction in man. Sci Rep. (2015) 5:1–12.
doi: 10.1038/srep10312
40. Hall MA. (1999). Correlation-based Feature Selection for Machine Learning.
The University of Waikato, Hamilton.
41. Breiman L. Random forest. Mach. Learn. (2001) 45:5–32.
doi: 10.1023/A:1010933404324
42. John GH, Langley P. Estimating continuous distributions in Bayesian
classifiers. In: Proceeding of the 11th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial
Intelligence. San Mateo, CA (1995). pp. 338–345.
43. Keerthi SS, Shevade SK, Bhattacharyya C, Murthy KRK. Improvements to
platt’s SMO algorithm for SVM classifier design. Neural Comput. (2001)
13:637–649. doi: 10.1162/089976601300014493
44. Landwehr N, Hall M, Frank E. Logistic model trees. Mach Learn. (2005)
95:161–205. doi: 10.1007/s10994-005-0466-3
45. Quinlan JS. (1993). C4.5: Programs for Machine Learning. San Mateo, CA:
Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
46. Mitchell T. Decision tree learning. In: Machine Learning. Mitchell T, editor.
New York, NY: McGraw Hill (1997). pp. 52–78.
47. Bowman H, Filetti M, Alsufyani A, Janssen D, Su L. Countering
countermeasures: detecting identity lies by detecting conscious breakthrough.
PLoS ONE (2014) 9:e90595. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0090595
48. Agosta S, Ghirardi V, Zogmaister C, Castiello U, Sartori G. Detecting
fakers of the autobiographical IAT. Appl Cogn Psychol. (2010) 25:299–306.
doi: 10.1002/acp.1691
49. Peth J, Suchotzki K, Matthias G. Influence of countermeasures on the
validity of the concealed information test. Psychophysiology (2016) 53:
1429–40. doi: 10.1111/psyp.12690
50. Conroy MA, Kwartner PP. Malingering. Appl Psychol Crim Justice (2006)
2:29–51.
51. Monaro M, Galante C, Spolaor R, Li QQ, Gamberini L, Conti M, et
al. Covert lie detection using keyboard dynamics. Sci Rep. (2018) 8:1976.
doi: 10.1038/s41598-018-20462-6
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
The reviewer AH and handling Editor declared their shared affiliation.
Copyright © 2018 Monaro, Toncini, Ferracuti, Tessari, Vaccaro, De Fazio, Pigato,
Meneghel, Scarpazza and Sartori. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution
or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the
copyright owner are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction
is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 12 June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 249
